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 Abstract  
The importance of compassion is widely recognized and it is receiving increasing 
research attention. Yet, there is lack of consensus on definition and a paucity of 
psychometrically robust measures of this construct. Without an agreed definition and 
adequate measures, we cannot study compassion, measure compassion or evaluate whether 
interventions designed to enhance compassion are effective. In response, this paper proposes 
a definition of compassion and offers a systematic review of self- and observer-rated 
measures. Following consolidation of existing definitions, we propose that compassion 
consists of five elements: recognizing suffering, understanding the universality of human 
suffering, feeling for the person suffering, tolerating uncomfortable feelings, and motivation 
to act/acting to alleviate suffering. Three databases were searched (Web of Science, PsycInfo, 
and Medline) and nine measures included and rated for quality. Quality ratings ranged from 2 
to 7 out of 14 with low ratings due to poor internal consistency for subscales, insufficient 
evidence for factor structure and/or failure to examine floor/ceiling effects, test-retest 
reliability, and discriminant validity. We call for empirical testing of our five-element 
definition, if supported, the development of a measure of compassion based on this 
operational definition, and which demonstrates adequate psychometric properties.  
Keywords: compassion; self-compassion; measure; systematic review; definition 
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Introduction 
The importance of compassion is recognized in many segments of society. Most of 
the world’s religious traditions place compassion at the center of their belief systems. 
International professional bodies in healthcare, education and the justice system also 
emphasize the importance of compassion. In the US, compassion is enshrined in the 
American Medical Association’s (AMA) Principles of Medical Ethics, with Item 1 stating 
that “A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical services with 
compassion and respect for human dignity” (AMA, 1981). In the UK, compassion is one of 
the six core values in the NHS constitution (Department of Health; DoH, 2013), and calls for 
a greater focus on compassion have been driven in part by high profile exposés of serious 
failings in compassionate care at some hospitals and care homes. The international 
‘Compassion in Education’ foundation (CoED, 2014) offers a range of services to 
educational professionals in order to promote compassion in the education system. It has also 
been argued that compassion should lie at the core of the ethical framework guiding our 
justice systems (Norko, 2005).  
An evolutionary perspective on compassion can be traced to Darwin (1871), who 
stated that “those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic 
members would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring” (p. 130). Current 
theorists also note that compassion is reproductively advantageous, being part of the care-
giving system that has evolved to nurture and protect the young (e.g. Gilbert, 2005; Goetz, 
Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010). Compassion can be seen as having evolved from an 
adaptive focus on protecting oneself and one’s offspring to a broader focus on protecting 
others including and beyond one’s immediate kinship group (de Waal, 2009). Compassion 
may also have evolved in primates because it is a desirable criterion in mate selection and 
facilitates cooperative relationships with non-kin (e.g. de Waal, 2009; Keltner, 2009).  
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Within the healthcare domain, compassion is believed to have numerous practical 
advantages. It has been argued that treating patients compassionately has wide-ranging 
benefits, including improving clinical outcomes, increasing patient satisfaction with services, 
and enhancing the quality of information gathered from patients (Epstein et al., 2005; 
Rendelmeir et al., 1995; Sanghavi, 2006). Conversely, compassion fatigue may contribute to 
poor quality of care (Najjar et al., 2009). Treating oneself and others with compassion is also 
believed to promote individual wellbeing and improve mental health (e.g. Cosley et al., 2010; 
Feldman & Kuyken, 2011; MacBeth & Gumley, 2012). Accordingly, some researchers have 
called for the implementation of interventions that seek to enhance people’s ability to give 
and receive compassion (e.g. Gilbert, 2005; 2010; Neff & Germer, 2012), arguing that 
compassion buffers reactivity to stress and is central to the process of recovery from 
psychopathology. Other research has focused on the developmental trajectory of compassion 
and has found relationships between parenting styles and children’s levels of sympathy and 
caring (Eisenberg et al., 2015) and between attachment security in childhood and capacity for 
compassion in adulthood (see Gillath, Shaver, & Mukilincer, 2005, for a review).  
Despite the importance of compassion and increasing interest from researchers, 
clinicians, teachers, and other professionals, there is lack of consensus on its definition and a 
paucity of psychometrically robust measurement tools. Without these, scientific enquiry is 
greatly impeded – we need consensus on a definition and valid and reliable measurement 
tools in order to assess compassion in empirical research. This paper has two aims: first, to 
suggest a definition of compassion based on a consolidation of conceptualizations and 
definitions in the field and second, to systematically review self- and observer-rated measures 
of compassion.  
Conceptualizations of Compassion: Towards a Definition 
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According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “compassion” stems from the 
Latin “compati”, meaning “to suffer with”. In the literature, there appears to be a broad 
consensus that compassion involves feeling for a person who is suffering and being 
motivated to act to help them (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Goetz et al., 2010). For example, in his 
seminal work on human emotions Lazarus defines compassion as: “Being moved by 
another’s suffering and wanting to help” (p. 289). Similarly, in a major systematic review of 
compassion and its evolutionary origins, Goetz et al. define it as: “the feeling that arises in 
witnessing another’s suffering and that motivates a subsequent desire to help” (p. 351). These 
definitions have in common the suggestion that compassion is not only about feeling touched 
by a person’s suffering, but also about wanting to act to help them. Compassion is a 
fundamental tenet of Buddhist philosophy (it is, in fact, emphasized by all the main world 
religions but Buddhist perspectives on compassion have been given greater prominence in the 
psychological literature) and the Dalai Lama (1995) defines compassion in comparable terms 
as: “An openness to the suffering of others with a commitment to relieve it”. However, within 
Buddhism, compassion is seen not only as an emotional response but also as a response 
founded on reason and wisdom which is embedded in an ethical framework concerned with 
the selfless intention of freeing others from suffering.  
More specifically, in their review of compassion within organizations, Kanov et al. 
(2004) argue that compassion consists of three facets: noticing, feeling, and responding. 
‘Noticing’ involves being aware of a person’s suffering, either by cognitively recognizing 
this suffering or by experiencing an unconscious physical or affective reaction to it. ‘Feeling’ 
is defined as responding emotionally to that suffering and experiencing ‘empathic concern’ 
through adopting the person’s perspective and imagining or feeling their condition. Finally, 
‘responding’ involves having a desire to act to alleviate the person’s suffering. As in 
Buddhist conceptualizations, this definition suggests that compassion does not purely consist 
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of affective and behavioral elements, but also may have cognitive components insofar as it 
involves being able to imagine and reason about a person’s experiences. 
Gilbert (2010) conceptualizes compassion in evolutionary terms, arguing that 
compassion is an evolved motivational system designed to regulate negative affect, where 
compassion is seen to have originated from the same capacities that primates evolved to form 
attachment bonds and engage in affiliative and cooperative behaviors for group survival. He 
defines compassion as: “A deep awareness of the suffering of another coupled with the wish 
to relieve it” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 13) and, like Kanov et al. (2004), suggests it has cognitive, 
affective and behavioral elements. Gilbert (2010) sees compassion as consisting of six 
‘attributes’: sensitivity, sympathy, empathy, motivation/caring, distress tolerance and non-
judgement. ‘Sensitivity’ involves being responsive to other people’s emotions and perceiving 
when they need help, which appears to correspond to Kanov et al.’s ‘noticing’ facet. 
‘Sympathy’ (defined as showing concern for the other person’s suffering) and ‘empathy’ 
(defined as putting yourself in their shoes) together appear to correspond to Kanov et al.’s 
‘feeling’ facet. Finally, ‘motivation’ to act is akin to Kanov et al.’s ‘responding’ facet.  
The final two components in Gilbert’s (2010) model – ‘distress tolerance’ and ‘non-
judgement’ – are not included in Kanov et al.’s (2004) model. Distress tolerance is defined as 
the ability to tolerate difficult emotions in oneself when confronted with someone else’s 
suffering without becoming overwhelmed by them. Gilbert argues that this is important 
because if we over-identify with a person’s suffering we may feel a need to get away from 
them or reduce our awareness of their distress, preventing a compassionate response. This 
suggests that, although compassion is about ‘suffering with’ another person, if we feel such 
extreme personal distress in the face of another’s suffering that we become too focused on 
our own discomfort, this may hinder our ability to help. The final element of Gilbert’s model 
– ‘non-judgement’ – is defined as the ability to remain accepting of and tolerant towards 
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another person even when their condition, or response to it, gives rise to difficult feelings in 
oneself, such as frustration, anger, fear or disgust. The idea that compassion means 
approaching those who are suffering with non-judgement and tolerance – even if they are in 
some sense disagreeable to us – is also central to Buddhist conceptualizations. For example, 
the Dalai Lama (2002) contends that: “for a practitioner of love and compassion, an enemy is 
one of the most important teachers. Without an enemy you cannot practice tolerance, and 
without tolerance you cannot build a sound basis of compassion” (p. 75).  
Both Gilbert (2005, 2010) and the Dalai Lama are also clear that compassion is not 
only felt for close others (where attachment comes into play as well), but also for those we do 
not know. Similarly, Gilbert (2003, cited in Wang, 2005) notes: “One can feel compassion for 
those we might never meet (the starving children in Africa)” (p. 99-100). The idea that 
compassion can be experienced towards close others and those we do not know is also 
emphasized by Sprecher and Fehr (2005) who developed a measure of ‘compassionate love’ 
which includes separate versions relating to close others and strangers or humankind at large. 
Like Gilbert (2010), Wispe (1991) conceptualizes compassion for others not only as 
being aware of and moved by suffering and wanting to help, but also as including the ability 
to adopt a non-judgmental stance towards others and to tolerate one’s own distress when 
faced with other people’s suffering. Neff (2003a) developed this definition of compassion for 
others into a model of self-compassion, arguing that self-compassion can be viewed as 
compassion directed inward towards the self. She concludes that self-compassion consists of 
three principal components: kindness (being kind and non-judgmental towards the self rather 
than self-critical), mindfulness (which, like ‘distress tolerance’, involves holding painful 
feelings in mindful awareness rather than over-identifying with them), and common humanity 
(seeing one’s suffering as part of the human condition rather than as isolating).  
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It is debatable whether compassion for others and self-compassion are in fact part of 
the same overarching construct. While Buddhist thinking argues that differentiating 
compassion for others from self-compassion means drawing a false distinction between the 
self and others, and moreover that self-compassion is a prerequisite for showing ‘true’ 
compassion towards others, recent research has found that associations between self-
compassion and other-focused compassion may be weak, or even non-existent for some 
populations. For example, Neff and Pommier (2013) explored the relationship between self-
compassion and compassion for others and found that they were not correlated in a sample of 
undergraduates (r = .00), and only weakly correlated in a community sample and a sample of 
practicing meditators (r = .15 and .28 respectively). Similarly, Pommier (2010) found no 
association between self-compassion and compassion for others in a sample of 
undergraduates (r = .07). It is unclear whether the lack of association between self-
compassion and compassion for others reflects a genuine independence between these two 
constructs or whether it reflects definitional problems, weaknesses of correlational study 
designs or limitations with current measures (e.g. Williams, Dalgleish, Karl, & Kuyken, 
2014). This is an area for further empirical research.  
While acknowledging some of the difficulties with equating self-compassion with 
compassion for others, Pommier (2010) has applied Neff’s (2003a) model of self-compassion 
to a model of compassion for others suggesting that, like self-compassion, compassion for 
others can be seen as involving kindness, mindfulness and common humanity. In Pommier’s 
model, ‘kindness’ is defined as being understanding towards others who are suffering instead 
of being critical or indifferent towards them. ‘Mindfulness’ is seen as the ability to notice 
another person’s suffering and remain open to it without feeling so distressed that you 
disengage from that person. And ‘common humanity’ is conceptualized as realizing that all 
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humans suffer and that one could find oneself in the position of the sufferer if one was less 
fortunate – a sense that “There but for the grace of God, go I”.  
This emphasis on seeing a ‘common humanity’ with the person who is suffering is 
also evident in Buddhist definitions of compassion, with the Dalai Lama (2005) arguing that: 
“Genuine compassion must have both wisdom and loving kindness. That is to say, one must 
understand the nature of the suffering from which we wish to free others (this is wisdom), 
and one must experience deep intimacy and empathy with other sentient beings (this is loving 
kindness)” (p. 49). Within such Buddhist conceptualizations, understanding the nature of 
suffering (‘wisdom’) is to understand that suffering is part of what it is to be human; suffering 
is a shared human experience. Similarly, in their review of the role of compassion in 
mindfulness-based therapies, Feldman and Kuyken (2011) describe compassion as: “an 
orientation of mind that recognizes pain and the universality of pain in human experience and 
the capacity to meet that pain with kindness, empathy, equanimity and patience” (p. 145). 
In summary, in all these definitions compassion is seen as awareness of someone’s 
suffering, being moved by it (emotionally and, according to some definitions, cognitively), 
and acting or feeling motivated to help. Several definitions emphasize that, although one is 
moved by suffering, compassion also involves being able to tolerate uncomfortable feelings 
that arise in oneself as a result of seeing suffering, including tolerating feelings of distaste, 
frustration or anger that might be elicited by that suffering. There is also a suggestion in 
several definitions that compassion involves recognizing a commonality with the sufferer, 
acknowledging that as a fellow being we too could find ourselves in a similar position. Table 
1 contains summaries of the major definitions of compassion discussed in this section. 
Related Constructs 
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In definitions of compassion, reference is commonly made to related terms such as 
empathy and in turn these words are often used to define each other. The similarities between 
compassion and constructs such as kindness, pity and altruism have also been noted (Goetz et 
al., 2010). It is instructive to consider the overlaps and distinctions between these terms. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word empathy is defined as: “the 
power of mentally identifying oneself with (and so fully comprehending) a person or object 
of contemplation”. Like compassion, empathy has been described as a multidimensional 
construct, consisting of cognitive and affective components (Davis, 1983). Cognitive 
empathy can be defined as intellectually understanding another person’s emotions and 
perspective (Hogan, 1969), whereas affective empathy refers to being affected by and sharing 
another’s emotions (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). Gilbert (2010), Kanov et al. (2004) and the 
Dalai Lama (2005) all explicitly define compassion as requiring empathy and therefore 
appear to see empathy as an essential element of compassion. Even so, they suggest that 
compassion has additional components over and above empathy. In particular, a desire to act 
or acting to alleviate suffering is seen as a core feature of compassion but not empathy (see 
Table 1). 
A second distinction between compassion and empathy is that, whereas compassion is 
felt specifically in response to suffering, empathy may apply to a broader range of situations, 
for example one could feel empathy with someone else’s anger, fear or joy (Pommier, 2010). 
Moreover, Goetz et al. (2010) argue that compassion is an emotion in its own right, whereas 
empathy is the vicarious experience of another’s emotions, while Sprecher and Fehr (2005) 
contend that compassion is broader than empathy because it can be felt for humanity at large, 
rather than only in relation to specific interpersonal encounters. In addition, recent 
neuroscientific findings suggest that different brain regions are activated in response to 
compassion and empathy training (Klimecki, Leiberg, Ricard, & Singer, 2014). 
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The same is true of pity, which, despite also having similarities to compassion, does 
not require an inclination to help. On the contrary, some writers have argued that pity implies 
that one sees someone as unworthy of help (Lazarus, 1991), or at least involves showing 
condescension towards them (e.g. Cassell, 2002). At the other end of the spectrum, altruism 
has a greater focus than compassion on behavioral acts that may be at a great personal cost to 
the person. Also, altruistic acts can have a broad range of motivations, that do not necessarily 
involve the same elements as compassion. .  
Finally, compassion is frequently linked to kindness (defined by the Oxford English 
Dictionary as “the quality of being friendly, generous and considerate”). For example, Neff 
(2003a) and Pommier (2010) include ‘kindness’ as a component of compassion and 
compassion has even been defined as “intelligent kindness” (e.g. DoH, 2013). However, 
these two terms have distinctions too: for example, as outlined compassion includes elements 
beyond kindness (e.g. recognizing and being touched by suffering); and likewise, kindness 
includes elements beyond compassion, as kindness is not only linked to suffering (e.g. 
remembering someone’s birthday is kind but not compassionate). Additionally, compassion 
may not always involve kindness in the moment (e.g. taking a ‘tough love’ approach may be 
compassionate but not kind). . 
Compassion: A Proposed Definition  
To bring together the various definitions and considerations above and to aid the 
review of existing measures of compassion, we propose a new definition of compassion as a 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral process consisting of the following five elements that 
refer to both self- and other-compassion: 1) Recognizing suffering; 2) Understanding the 
universality of suffering in human experience; 3) Feeling empathy for the person suffering 
and connecting with the distress (emotional resonance); 4) Tolerating uncomfortable feelings 
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aroused in response to the suffering person (e.g. distress, anger, fear) so remaining open to 
and accepting of the person suffering; and 5) Motivation to act/acting to alleviate suffering. 
We use this proposed new definition of compassion to organize the remainder of this 
paper, which provides a systematic review of self- and observer-rated measures of 
compassion. The psychometric properties of identified measures are reported and rated for 
quality, including the extent to which they measure each of the five elements outlined above.  
Method 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
To be included in the main review, measures had to: be available in English; include a 
scale explicitly defined by its authors as measuring compassion; include a psychometric 
paper outlining the development of the scale; and be obtainable either within a published 
article or from the author (two attempts were made to contact the relevant authors to obtain 
measures where necessary). Measures were excluded if they did not assess participants’ 
levels of compassion per se (e.g. measures of barriers to feeling compassion, fear of 
compassion, and empathy were excluded); used non-questionnaire measures of compassion, 
or included only a subscale on compassion. Because we do not yet know the relationship 
between compassion for others and self-compassion,  measures of self-compassion were 
included because many conceptualizations and definitions of compassion do not distinguish 
between other- and self-compassion.  
Information Sources 
The databases searched for relevant measures included Web of Science (Thomson 
Reuters), PsycInfo, and Medline, from inception to 23 September 2015. Dissertations and 
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theses that met the inclusion criteria were reviewed along with papers published in peer-
reviewed journals. Where relevant, the most recent versions of measures were reviewed. 
Search Strategy 
All articles including the word “compassion*” in combination with “measure*”, 
“scale*”, “instrument*” or “questionnaire*” in either the title or abstract or key words were 
identified. Where identified papers referred to additional scales, reference lists were searched 
and any additional relevant papers retrieved. Experts in the field were also consulted to 
ensure that no measures were missed. 
Assessment of Quality 
The psychometric properties of each measure were reviewed and measures were rated 
for quality based largely on Terwee et al.’s (2007) quality criteria for health status measures. 
These criteria were used because they include explicit criteria for what constitutes good 
measurement properties. However, since these criteria relate to measures of health status, 
Barker, Pistrang, and Elliott’s (2002) ‘rules of thumb’ for evaluating psychological measures 
were also drawn on where these seemed more appropriate1. Terwee et al. award measures a 
positive (+), intermediate (?), or negative (-) rating, or a rating of 0 where no information 
regarding the relevant criteria is provided. In this review, in order to make scores easier to 
interpret, measures were given a score of 2 if there was evidence for the criterion being fully 
met, 1 if the criterion was partially met, and 0 if the criterion was not met, or if no relevant 
data were reported. Scores were aggregated to provide an overall rating. Two researchers 
                                                          
1
 Terwee et al. (2007) proposed the following eight quality criteria to evaluate health status measures: 1) 
Content validity, 2) internal consistency, 3) criterion validity, 4) construct validity (convergent and discriminant 
validity), 5) reproducibility (test-retest reliability), 6) responsiveness, 7) floor and ceiling effects, and 8) 
interpretability. We did not include criterion validity and responsiveness as criteria, for the reasons stated in the 
paper. Terwee et al. did not provide rules of thumb in terms of the size of correlation coefficients for the test-
retest reliability criterion. They also did not account for the size of correlations for the convergent and 
discriminant validity criterion. Therefore, for these two criteria, we drew on Barker at al.’s (2002) general 
recommendations when evaluating the reliability and validity of psychological measures. We also included 
factor structure as a criterion. 
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independently scored the measures using these criteria, and any discrepancies in scoring were 
resolved collectively. Specifically, measures were rated across the following domains:  
1. Content validity (the extent to which the domain of interest was comprehensively sampled 
by the items in the questionnaire). In this case the domain of interest was considered to be 
compassion as defined in this review, rather than as defined by the scale’s authors. Under 
this criterion, Terwee et al. (2007) also emphasize the importance of both members of the 
target population and experts being involved in item development. For this criterion to be 
fully met all five elements of compassion must be captured by the items and items must 
have been generated in consultation with experts and members of the intended population. 
2. Factor structure (whether or not the factor structure for the measure has been 
examined and supported). This criterion was included in addition to those proposed 
by Terwee et al. (2007). This criterion was scored as follows. A score of 2 was given 
where exploratory factor analysis (EFA) followed by confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) have been conducted in independent samples OR where CFA has been 
conducted if the factor structure has been previously proposed theoretically (a score of 
2 was only given if the factor analyses support the proposed factor structure). A score 
of 1 was given if only EFA has been conducted (without CFA) and if the EFA 
supports the factor structure. A score of 0 was given where either factor analysis has 
not been conducted OR where EFA and/or CFA have been conducted that do not 
support the proposed factor structure. 
3. Internal consistency (the extent to which items in a (sub)scale are inter-correlated and thus 
measuring the same construct). For this criterion to be fully met - in line with Terwee et 
al.’s (2007) criteria - factor analyses had to have been performed on an adequate sample 
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size (7 * number of items and N > 100) and Cronbach’s alpha for each identified factor 
had to be between .70 and .95. 
4. Test-retest reliability. Based on Barker et al.’s (2002) ‘rules of thumb’ test-retest 
reliabilities had to be at least r = .70 for this criterion to be fully met. 
5. Convergent and discriminant validity (the extent to which scores on a particular scale 
relate to other measures in a manner consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses). For 
this criterion to be met, Terwee et al. (2007) require that (i) specific hypotheses are 
formulated by the scale’s authors about expected correlations and (ii) at least three 
quarters of results are in line with expectations. As Terwee et al. do not take into account 
the strength of these correlations, we also drew on Barker et al. (2002), and required that at 
least two correlations with theoretically related constructs were at least r = .50 to 
demonstrate convergent validity. 
6. Floor and ceiling effects (the number of respondents achieving the highest or lowest 
possible scores). This was rated based on Terwee et al.’s (2007) criterion that no more 
than 15% of the sample should receive the top or bottom score on a scale. 
7. Interpretability (how differences in scores on the measure can be interpreted, or the degree 
to which qualitative meaning can be attached to quantitative scores). Terwee et al. (2007) 
require means and SDs of scores from at least four relevant subgroups of participants to be 
reported (e.g. compassion scores in males vs. females, meditators vs. non-meditators) and 
minimal important change defined. However, as minimal important change was arguably 
not entirely relevant to the measures in this review, consideration was instead given to 
whether the authors indicated how scale scores might be interpreted.  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 16  
Terwee et al.’s (2007) quality ratings also include ‘criterion validity’ (the extent to 
which scores on a particular scale relate to a ‘gold standard’) and ‘responsiveness’ (the ability 
of a scale to detect change over time). However, these two criteria were not rated. In the case 
of ‘criterion validity’ this was because there is no gold standard compassion measure to rate 
scales against. In the case of ‘responsiveness’ it was because such data were not typically 
available and, as this criterion relates to clinically meaningful change, arguably the majority 
of the scales were not primarily designed to measure this. Therefore, the total possible score 
for any measure was 14. 
Results 
Review of Identified Measures 
Figure 1 shows a flow diagram illustrating the search process. After removing 
duplicates, 2,146 papers were identified, with only nine measures included after screening 
titles, abstracts, and full texts. Table 2 provides the quality ratings of the reviewed measures 
and Tables 3 and 4 outline the psychometric properties of the measures. Floor and ceiling 
effects are not included in Tables 3 and 4 because no studies reported them. Similarly, 
although most studies included measures of related constructs to test convergent validity, 
none included measures of theoretically unrelated constructs; therefore, discriminant validity 
is not included in Table 4.  
Compassionate love scale (CLS; Sprecher & Fehr, 2005). The CLS consists of 21 
self-report items, rated on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all true of me) to 7 (very true of me). 
The CLS is intended for the general population and consists of two forms: one relating to 
significant others (including family members and friends) and one focusing on strangers and 
humanity at large.  
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Content validity. The scale was rated as partially satisfactory for content validity. 
Items were generated by the investigators based on a review of the literature on love and 
altruism and also based on a prototype analysis with laypeople around their concept of 
compassionate love. In line with our definition of compassion, the scale includes items 
related to four of our five elements of compassion identified earlier: Feeling moved by other 
people’s suffering (emotional resonance), understanding or imagining something about their 
condition as a fellow being, accepting and not judging others (which implies tolerance), and 
being motivated to help them. However, the CLS did not appear to contain items explicitly 
related to recognizing suffering.  
Three items include the word ‘compassion’ or ‘compassionate love’, which requires 
respondents to define these concepts themselves. However, it seems uncertain whether they 
will know what is meant by ‘compassionate love’ or define it uniformly. Additionally, not all 
items on the scale relate to those who are suffering, and it is questionable whether items such 
as: “I feel happy when I see that [loved ones/others (strangers)] are happy” and “I very much 
wish to be kind and good to [my friends and family members/fellow human beings]” assess 
compassion or in fact more broadly assess empathy and kindness respectively. Finally, the 
scale refers explicitly to either close others or strangers, but does not allow respondents to 
consider people who may not fall into either of these categories (e.g. patients responding in 
relation to healthcare professionals), potentially limiting its use in some contexts. 
Factor structure and reliability. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) yielded a single 
factor structure for each version of the scale. Sprecher and Fehr (2005) did not explicitly 
propose a factor structure for the CLS prior to analysis and did not conduct CFA. Internal 
consistency was high for both versions. Test-retest reliability was not reported. 
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Convergent validity and interpretability.  Convergent validity was supported by 
significant correlations in the expected directions with measures of empathy, helpfulness, 
volunteerism, and spiritual experiences. Limited subgroup analyses were undertaken by 
Sprecher and Fehr (2005), showing that women obtained significantly higher compassion 
scores than men on both versions.   
Santa Clara brief compassion scale (SCBCS; Hwang, Plante, & Lackey, 2008). 
The SCBCS is a shortened version of Sprecher and Fehr’s (2005) CLS, consisting of five 
items from the original scale (the correlation between the two scales is r = .95). Unlike the 
CLS, this scale refers exclusively to strangers rather than to close others. The items of the 
SCBCS were selected because they had moderate means, high standard deviations, and high 
correlations with the overall score from the CLS.  
Content validity. The SCBCS was rated partially satisfactory for content validity. The 
scale includes items related to two of our five elements of compassion: Emotionally 
connecting with other people’s suffering and acting to help them. However, unlike the CLS, 
the SCBCS did not appear to contain items explicitly related to understanding the universality 
of suffering and tolerating uncomfortable feelings, and also did not include items explicitly 
related to recognizing suffering. Two items contain the word “compassion”, again relying on 
respondents to define these terms rather than tapping into their underlying elements. 
Factor structure and reliability. EFA yielded a single factor structure for the SCBCS 
and CFA was not conducted. Internal consistency was high. Test-retest reliability was not 
reported.  
Convergent validity and interpretability. The SCBCS was strongly correlated with 
empathic concern, moderately correlated with vocational identity, and showed a small 
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correlation with strength of religious faith. Examination of group differences was limited to 
gender and showed that women scored significantly higher than men. 
The compassion scale (CS-M; Martins, Nicholas, Shaheen, Jones, & Norris, 
2013). Martins et al.’s CS-M is a 10-item self-report scale developed to measure five domains 
of compassion: generosity, hospitality, objectivity, sensitivity, and tolerance across social 
networks and relationships (strangers, friends, and family) using a 1 (none) to 7 (all) response 
scale. The aim of the scale was to provide a measure of compassion across domains that 
could be enhanced through training, as the authors argue that scales like the CLS do not lend 
themselves well to measuring compassion in a way that can be targeted for education. Items 
were generated and evaluated by a panel of academic and community experts. 
Content validity. Martins et al.’s (2013) scale was rated partially satisfactory for 
content validity. The CS-M focuses exclusively on practical acts of compassion including 
giving financial help to others, using your free time to help others, and doing things for others 
at a cost or risk to yourself or your family and friends. Thus, only the acting to alleviate 
suffering factor of our five-factor definition is captured by the items of the CS-M; items 
related to recognizing suffering, understanding the universality of suffering, emotional 
resonance, and tolerating uncomfortable feelings were not included. Additionally, it could be 
argued that the scale’s items measure only a limited range of acts of compassion (giving 
away money, using free time to help others, sharing personal space, or doing something for 
others at a cost to oneself) and if the scale were applied to certain contexts (e.g. a healthcare 
context), the items may not assess the types of actions that might be expected in those 
contexts (e.g. considering ways to make those who are suffering more comfortable). Indeed, 
it is not altogether clear for what population the scale is intended. Furthermore, items such as 
“How many times would you do the right thing if it puts your family at risk” do not appear to 
fit well with a response ranging from “none” to “all”.  
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Factor structure and reliability. EFA did not support the proposed five factor 
structure; the analysis identified a two-factor solution. However, the two-factor structure was 
rejected by the authors in favour of a single factor model, arguing that, as all items beginning 
“How much of your…?” loaded onto one factor and all items beginning “How many times 
would you…?” loaded onto the second factor, the factors appeared to reflect methodological 
differences between items rather than substantively different constructs. Cronbach’s alpha for 
the total scale was acceptable. Test-retest reliability was not tested. 
Convergent validity and interpretability. The authors only compared their scale with 
the CLS (r > .50). In terms of interpretability, the authors provided mean scores for a range of 
subgroups but, though they argue that the scale should help measure change in compassion 
after training, they do not provide any indication of what level of change on the scale would 
be needed to show that such training had been of value.  
Self-compassion scale (SCS; Neff, 2003b). The SCS is a 26-item scale with a 5-point 
response scale from “almost never” to “almost always”.  
Content validity. The scale was rated partially satisfactory overall for content validity. 
Although items were selected after extensive piloting, it is notable that this was only carried 
out with experts and undergraduate students, even though the scale’s target population 
included community and clinical samples. The scale includes items related to four of the five 
elements in the definition of compassion used in this review: understanding the universality 
of suffering, emotional resonance, the ability to tolerate distressing feelings, and feeling 
motivated to act or acting to help ameliorate one’s suffering. However, the scale does not 
include items specifically relating to being attentive to how one is feeling. 
Factor structure and reliability. CFA of the SCS supported the six factor model, with 
each of the three components of self-compassion split into two sub-factors - one comprising 
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‘positively’ worded and one ‘negatively’ worded items. This resulted in the following factors: 
kindness versus self-judgement; mindfulness versus over-identification; and common 
humanity versus isolation. However, Neff (2003b) found only a marginal fit with a single 
higher-order factor, questioning whether the six factors can be explained by a single 
overarching construct of self-compassion. Other studies have also questioned the higher-
order factor structure and the non-hierarchical six-factor model across a range of populations, 
student, clinical and meditating/non-meditating (e.g. Costa, Marôco, Pinto-Gouveia, Ferreira, 
& Castilho, 2015; López et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2014). Several studies have suggested a 
two-factor model of self-compassion, with the factors representing the positive and negative 
dimensions of self-compassion and self-criticism, respectively (e.g. Costa et al., 2015; López 
et al., 2015).  
Recently, Neff (2015) argued that the two-factor conceptualization of the SCS is 
problematic in that it does not capture the relative balance between the three proposed broad 
components of self-compassion (self-kindness vs. self-judgment, common humanity vs. 
isolation, and mindfulness vs. over-identification). Instead, Neff proposed a bifactor model of 
self-compassion, where each item loads directly on to a general factor as well as their 
respective subscale, and suggests that researchers can select whether to analyse subscale 
scores separately or use a total SCS score depending on their interests. 
Cronbach’s alpha values for total SCS scale and subscale scores and test-retest 
reliability were adequate.  
Convergent validity and interpretability. Convergent validity was supported by 
significant correlations in the expected direction between the SCS and other related measures, 
several of which were ≥ .50. A partially satisfactory score was achieved for interpretability, 
as only gender differences were reported. 
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Self-compassion scale: Short form (SCS-SF; Raes, Pommier, Neff, & Van Gucht, 
2011). Raes et al. developed a 12-item version of the SCS by selecting two items from each 
of the SCS’s six subscales, based on their high correlations with the SCS and intended 
subscales, and high intercorrelations. The SCS-SF is rated in the same way as the SCS. 
Content validity. The scale was rated ‘partially satisfactory’ for content validity for 
the same reasons as the long form.  
Factor structure and reliability. CFA supported the proposed six-factor hierarchical 
structure of the measure. Internal consistency was acceptable for the total score, but was 
variable for the individual subscales. Test-retest reliability was not reported. 
Convergent validity and interpretability. Relevant data were not reported for 
convergent validity and interpretability. 
The compassion scale (CS-P; Pommier, 2010). The CS-P is a 24-item self-report 
scale targeted at the general population and based on the argument (outlined earlier) that 
compassion consists of six elements: Kindness (in contrast to indifference), mindfulness (in 
contrast to disengagement), and common humanity (in contrast to separation). Responses are 
given on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always).  
Content validity. The CS-P was rated partially satisfactory for content validity. Items 
were devised by the author, based on theory and research, and reviewed by a panel of experts. 
The scale includes items consistent with four of our five elements of compassion: 
Recognizing suffering, feeling moved by suffering, understanding or imagining something 
about another person’s condition as a fellow being, and motivation to act/acting to alleviate 
suffering. Although in her development of the scale Pommier (2010) notes that compassion 
requires the ability to tolerate uncomfortable feelings in the face of suffering so that one can 
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remain tolerant and accepting of others, the scale appears not to directly assess this, other 
than asking whether respondents “try to keep a balanced perspective on the situation” when 
people tell them about their problems, or whether they tend to avoid those who suffer. 
Additionally, several of the scale’s items include the words ‘sometimes’, ‘often’ or 
‘usually’ which conflict with the response scale used (‘almost never’ to ‘almost always’) and 
makes responses difficult to interpret. The response scale is perhaps also unintuitive for 
negatively worded items – for example, a response of “I almost never don’t feel emotionally 
connected to people in pain” may be difficult for some people to rate accurately. Similarly, 
items such as “Suffering is just a part of the common human experience” cannot be answered 
accurately using the scale from ‘almost never’ to ‘almost always’ and do not sit well with the 
scale’s instructions to “indicate how often you behave in the stated manner”.  
Factor structure and reliability. CFA supported the proposed six-factor structure of 
the measure, and that a single higher order factor of compassion explained the inter-
correlations between the six factors. EFA was not conducted because Neff’s (2003b) Self-
Compassion Scale (SCS) had already demonstrated these six factors. However, as noted 
earlier compassion for others and self-compassion were not significantly correlated in 
Pommier’s (2010) research, suggesting that the factor structure for each measure cannot be 
assumed to be identical. Internal consistency was high for the total score but mixed and 
inconsistent across samples for the subscales. Test-retest reliability was not reported. 
Convergent validity and interpretability. Convergent validity was supported by 
significant correlations in the expected direction between the CS-P and other measures of 
compassion, empathy, perspective-taking, and wisdom; several of these were ≥ .50. However, 
the CS-P was not significantly correlated with the SCS (Neff, 2003b), a problematic finding 
for the scale’s construct validity, given that the CS-P was developed based on the factor 
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structure of the SCS. Additionally, while the scale was positively correlated with the CLS, 
this correlation was only small for the strangers-humanity version (r = .27; r = .54 for the 
close others version). This suggests that the CS-P and the CLS may not be measuring the 
same construct. Another unexpected finding was that the Southampton Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (SMQ; Chadwick et al., 2008) had a small negative correlation with the CS-P. 
The only subgroup analyzed was gender, again showing that women scored higher than men. 
Relational compassion scale (RCS; Hacker, 2008). The RCS consists of 16 items 
rated on a four-point scale (from ‘do not agree’ to ‘agree strongly’). The scale consists of four 
subscales which measure respondents’ compassion for others and self-compassion, along 
with their beliefs about how compassionate other people are to each other, and their beliefs 
about how compassionate other people are to them. The latter two subscales extend beyond 
simply measuring respondents’ own levels of compassion, but the scale was nevertheless 
included because it defines itself as a comprehensive measure of compassion and also 
because the subscales were psychometrically tested individually.  
Content validity. The RCS was rated ‘partially satisfactory’ for content validity. The 
scale’s items that comprise the ‘compassion for others’ subscale assess people’s capacity to 
recognize and understand suffering and accept and not judge others (which implies 
tolerance), just two of the five elements in our definition of compassion. Additionally, some 
items relate to other people’s ‘experiences’ in general, rather than specifically to their 
suffering. The items comprising the self-compassion subscale assess emotional resonance and 
acting to alleviate suffering, two of the five elements in our definition. Items related to 
understanding the universality of suffering were not included in either subscale.  
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Factor structure and reliability. CFA using the final version of the RCS supported its 
proposed four-factor structure. Internal consistency was acceptable for all four subscales. 
Test-retest reliability was not tested. 
Convergent validity and interpretability. Although several correlations with related 
measures were ≥ .50, specific hypotheses appear not to have been set out in advance about 
the expected direction of correlations and, in the discussion, the author highlights some 
unexpected findings. For example, the ‘compassion for others’ subscale did not correlate 
significantly with a measure of self-criticism/self-attack and self-reassurance (Gilbert, Clarke, 
Hempel, Miles, & Irons, 2004) and although the self-compassion subscale was positively 
correlated with the SCS (r = .65), this is arguably weaker than might be expected given they 
allegedly measure the same construct. Only one subgroup was analyzed for interpretability 
(Arts versus Engineering students), however the authors stated no predictions about 
differences between these groups. 
Compassionate care assessment tool (CCAT; Burnell & Agan, 2013). The 28-item 
CCAT was developed to measure levels of compassion demonstrated by individual nurses 
providing care for patients in acute hospital settings. In contrast to the other scales reviewed 
so far, this scale is completed by patients in relation to their carers. Respondents rate 
compassionate care from two perspectives - the importance of each item to them personally, 
and the degree to which their individual nurses demonstrated these qualities. Ratings range 
from 1 to 4. A selection of possible items for the scale were derived from the Spiritual Needs 
Survey (Galek, Flannelly, Vane, & Galek, 2005) and the Caring Behaviors Inventory (Wu, 
Larrabee, & Putman, 2006), and refined after consulting with hospital staff involved in 
implementing national criteria for compassionate care, nurses, and patients. The CCAT 
focuses on four domains: the ability of carers to establish meaningful connection (e.g. having 
a sense of humor), to meet patient expectations (e.g. giving timely treatments), display caring 
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attributes (e.g. considering personal needs), and exhibit capable practitioner qualities (e.g. 
appearing competent).  
Content validity. Overall, the scale was considered partially satisfactory for content 
validity. It includes items relating to three of the five elements in our definition of 
compassion: whether patients thought carers felt for them (emotional resonance), acted to 
help relieve their suffering, and could tolerate distress (e.g. asking if they ‘remained calm at 
all times’, treated them non-judgmentally, and excused their shortcomings). Items related to 
recognizing suffering and understanding the universality of suffering were not included. 
Additionally, some of the items are rather ambiguous - for example, one item asks whether 
nurses “addressed difficult issues”, which could relate to their ability to tolerate distress, or to 
their ability to resolve more practical matters. It is also questionable whether the scale is 
actually measuring levels of compassion of nurses; factor analyses appear to have been 
carried out based on asking patients to rate how important each item was to them, rather than 
on asking them to rate the extent to which their carers behaved in this way.  
Furthermore, as a number of items were derived from the Spiritual Needs Survey, 
there is a fairly strong emphasis on whether spiritual support was offered to patients, which is 
not necessarily relevant to the measurement of compassion for all patients. Similarly, several 
items taken from the Caring Behaviors Inventory ask about whether nurses gave timely 
treatments to patients, showed skill with equipment and helped control pain; however, while 
competence may be important in order to provide compassionate care, such abilities in 
themselves do not necessarily equate to showing compassion. It could also be argued that 
some of the areas tapped, such as providing timely treatments, controlling pain, and providing 
access to spiritual support, depend on variables outside of nurses’ power (i.e. managerial or 
organizational level factors), and this raises a wider issue around the extent to which 
compassion can and should be measured at an individual or organizational level. 
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Factor structure and reliability. EFA supported a four-factor structure, with the four 
aforementioned domains. However, as previously noted, analyses appear to have been carried 
out based on asking patients to rate how important each item was to them, rather than on 
asking them to rate the extent to which their carers behaved in this way. This means that it is 
not clear whether the scale is measuring actual levels of compassion of their nurses per se. 
Additionally, the authors report that only 20 of the 28 items fit into the four factors identified, 
but they nonetheless appear to have retained all 28 items. Therefore, the CCAT was given a 
rating of 0 for factor structure. Cronbach’s alpha values were adequate for the total scale and 
subscales. Test-retest reliability was not reported. 
Convergent validity and interpretability. Convergent validity was not reported. 
Limited subgroup analyses were conducted for interpretability. 
The Schwartz Center compassionate care scale (SCCCS; Lown, Muncer, & 
Chadwick, 2015). The 12-item SCCCS was developed to measure patients’ ratings of 
compassionate inpatient care received from physicians’ during a recent hospitalization. 
Patients complete items using a ten-point scale from 1 (not at all successful) to 10 (very 
successful). Items were initially developed by a committee consisting of patients, family 
members of patients, and individuals working in healthcare policy and advocacy, and were 
fine-tuned in five focus groups with patients, physicians, and nurses.  
Content validity. Overall, the SCCCS was considered partially satisfactory for content 
validity. It includes items which could be interpreted to relate to three of the five elements in 
our definition of compassion: Whether patients thought physicians expressed sensitivity, care, 
and compassion for them (emotional resonance/acting to alleviate suffering), listened 
attentively (recognizing suffering), and acted in ways to relieve their suffering. The SCCCS 
did not appear to contain items related to understanding the universality of suffering and 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 28  
tolerating uncomfortable feelings. Additionally, a couple of items refer to competence in 
caring (whether physicians spend enough time with patients, whether physicians 
communicate test results in a timely manner) which does not necessarily equate to showing 
compassion and could be dependent on factors outside of physicians’ power (i.e. managerial 
or organizational level factors). 
Factor structure and reliability. The SCCCS originally consisted of 16 items which 
were split into two item sets and administered to 801 recently hospitalized patients; half were 
asked item set one and half item set two. The authors conducted an EFA and CFA for each 
set of items and concluded that items within each set were unidimensional. However, they did 
not conduct analyses on all of the items, making it impossible to determine whether the scale 
as a whole is unidimensional, or whether the measure consisted of two separate scales or 
subscales. Despite this, the SCCCS was presented as a single scale. Although Cronbach’s 
alpha values were adequate for both sets, these values were based on there being eight items 
in each set; the final 12-item scale consisted of seven items from the first set and five items 
from the second set after the removal of problematic items (e.g. items with lowest item-total 
correlations). The alpha value for all of the scale items was also missing. Test-retest 
reliability was not tested. 
Convergent validity and interpretability. The authors found moderate to large, 
positive correlations between scores on both sets of items from the 12-item SCCCS and 
related constructs. Interpretability was not tested.   
Discussion 
The first aim of this paper was to synthesize existing conceptualizations of 
compassion and to propose a new definition that integrates common elements. A range of 
definitions from Buddhist and Western psychological perspectives were considered and five 
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components of compassion were identified: recognition of suffering; understanding its 
universality; feeling sympathy, empathy, or concern for those who are suffering (which we 
describe as emotional resonance); tolerating the distress associated with the witnessing of 
suffering; and motivation to act or acting to alleviate the suffering. Each of these components 
has been articulated by several published definitions of compassion, although no single 
existing definition explicitly includes all five of them. We do not claim that these five 
elements constitute statistically distinct factors of an overarching construct of compassion; 
this possibility must be empirically tested. However, we argue that our definition provides a 
useful foundation for the development of a comprehensive new measure of compassion.  
The need for a new measure is supported by the findings of our review of existing 
measures of compassion. The maximum quality rating of any measure was seven out of a 
possible fourteen, suggesting that no scale exists that comprehensively measures compassion 
and provides scores with acceptable levels of reliability and validity. In other words, we 
cannot be confident that existing measures of compassion are measuring this construct 
accurately and this raises significant barriers to scientific progress in the field – how can we 
assess compassion and evaluate the effectiveness of interventions intended to enhance 
compassion if we cannot measure the construct accurately?  
Quality ratings were low both because of poor ratings for content validity (the extent 
to which items appeared to fit our definition of compassion) and because of poor or untested 
psychometric properties. Internal consistency was strong for total scores but weak for many 
subscales. Evidence for the proposed factor structure of some scales was weak or absent. The 
presence of floor or ceiling effects was not examined for any scale, and test-retest reliability 
was examined for only one. Convergent correlations were generally significant and in the 
expected directions, but discriminant validity was not assessed. Low quality ratings could 
also be attributed to measures being in their early stages of development and initial papers 
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being unlikely to include a thorough test of psychometric properties. Quality ratings for 
compassion measures may improve over time with additional research including 
psychometric research. 
The strongest measures identified were Neff’s (2003b) Self-Compassion Scale and 
Hacker’s (2008) Relational Compassion Scale, but neither of these measures capture each of 
the five elements in our definition. As Neff’s measure focuses on self-compassion rather than 
compassion more generally or compassion for others, it is in any case not entirely suitable as 
a measure that can be used to determine levels of compassion in populations for whom 
compassion toward others is of interest (e.g., healthcare professionals). Given the current 
enthusiasm for compassion across different contexts, it is critical for future research to 
develop a psychometrically robust measure of the proposed definition of compassion as well 
as to explore more fully the relationship between self- and other-compassion.  
Strengths and Limitations 
A strength of this review is its contribution to greater clarity in the conceptualization 
of compassion and its components, which have previously been described in a variety of 
ways. The five elements of compassion extracted from our synthesis of definitions suggests 
that compassion is a complex construct that includes emotion but is more than an emotion, as 
it also includes perceptiveness or sensitivity to suffering, understanding of its universality, 
acceptance, nonjudgment, and distress tolerance, and intentions to act in helpful ways. This 
conceptualization suggests that compassion can be state-like and trait-like. Sensitivity to 
one’s own or others’ suffering, emotional responsiveness, acceptance and nonjudgment in the 
face of suffering, and motivation to be helpful are all likely to fluctuate across time and 
situations. On the other hand, Goetz et al (2010) present evidence suggesting that compassion 
can be seen as a trait-like quality that endures over time (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2002). An 
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implicit assumption of compassion-focused interventions seems to be that a trait-like general 
tendency to be compassionate toward oneself or others can be developed through repeated 
practice of skills that cultivate compassionate states, attitudes, or behaviours. Additionally, 
although many of the questionnaires reviewed treat compassion as a disposition that is fairly 
consistent across contexts, some measures conceptualize compassion as operating within a 
particular context or social interaction (e.g., the CCAT).   
This review assumes that compassion can indeed be measured with questionnaire 
methods. Some authors have suggested that subtle but observable behaviours, such as using a 
soft tone of voice, may also be valid indicators of compassion (Cameron, Mazer, DeLuca, 
Mohile, & Epstein, 2013), while Pearson (2006) notes that acts of compassion are often 
‘invisible’, being “simple not clever; basic not exquisite; peripheral not central” (p. 22). This 
means that, as Dewar, Pullin, and Tocheris (2011) note, “there is a danger, therefore, of 
measuring what is easy to quantify, rather than what is important” (p. 32). Dewar et al. also 
point out that compassion can be seen as something that is negotiated between individuals in 
their interactions. These points suggest that, as with many psychological variables, 
questionnaire measures may only provide a partial picture of compassion. Furthermore, while 
questionnaire measures benefit from being simple to administer and complete, and helpful for 
tapping people’s underlying attitudes where these are not directly observable, it may be 
difficult for people to complete such measures accurately in some contexts, for example in 
situations where healthcare staff feel under threat to be seen to be compassionate. 
A further limitation of this review is the approach taken to identifying the definitions 
of compassion in Table 1. A systematic search was attempted but the way the field has 
evolved does not easily lend itself to a systematic review. Defining compassion was very 
rarely the primary purpose of papers; definitions were typically embedded as secondary to 
addressing the primary purpose of the paper. An early search generated an unfeasibly large 
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number of results. We therefore relied on the expertise of the authors to identify key theorists 
and sources in the field.  
The review also assumed that individual levels of compassion should be measured. 
However, it has been argued that measuring compassion at the individual level opens people 
to accusations that they are not sufficiently compassionate. For example, in a healthcare 
context, this may result in a tendency to blame healthcare professionals for failings that in 
fact relate to external factors such as resourcing pressures or organizational restructuring 
(Crawford et al., 2014). This is an important consideration and highlights the need to ensure 
that efforts to measure levels of compassion among individuals do not serve to overstate 
individual deficits while deflecting attention from the broader impact of resourcing 
constraints and wider organizational changes.  
Future Research 
This review has argued that currently no psychometrically robust self- or observer-
rated measure of compassion exists, despite widespread interest in measuring and enhancing 
compassion towards self and others. Future research should therefore focus on developing a 
psychometrically robust questionnaire-based measure of compassion, while keeping in mind 
the complexities around measuring this construct. It will subsequently be of value for future 
research to identify interventions (at both an individual level and organizational level) that 
have the potential to enhance compassion and examine whether changes in compassion 
mediate the outcomes of these interventions.  
Although our review provides a foundation for progressing research into compassion, 
it represents a starting point. Future work should articulate theory driven hypotheses that test 
the relationships between key constructs and the validity of our five-element definition of 
compassion. This will generate important new knowledge about  how these different 
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elements interact to give rise to compassion. It may be that some elements are facilitators of 
compassion or emergent factors rather than defining features.  
Using a range of designs (including prospective and experimental designs), and 
triangulation of measurement to include behavioral (e.g., observable compassionate 
responses), bio-behavioral measures (e.g.,  as derived from Gilbert’s theory) and self-report 
measures, will further aid the development of theory and understanding. It is likely that this 
will have real practical implications for how best to cultivate compassion in ways that support 
resilience and well being at both personal and societal levels. 
Conclusion 
In recent years, compassion has received increased scientific interest. Compassion has 
been defined here, in line with the literature, as involving five elements: recognizing 
suffering in others; understanding the common humanity of this suffering; feeling 
emotionally connected with the person who is suffering; tolerating difficult feelings that may 
arise; and acting or being motivated to act to help the person. A systematic search of 
measures of compassion was undertaken but all of the identified measures were found to have 
notable psychometric weaknesses. This is a serious limitation in the field. For example, 
without adequate measures, we cannot determine with any confidence levels of compassion 
or whether interventions designed to enhance compassion are effective. Therefore, we now 
call for empirical testing of our five element definition and the development of a measure of 
compassion, following good practice guidelines to identify items and to test its psychometric 
properties.  
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Table 1. Major definitions of compassion in the literature in relation to the five-element definition of 
compassion 
Major 
definitions of 
compassion in 
the literature 
in relation to 
the five-
element 
definition of 
compassion 
Definition of 
Compassion  
Recognizing 
suffering a  
Understandin
g the 
universality 
of suffering  
Emotional 
resonance  
Tolerating 
uncomfortabl
e feelings  
Motivation to 
act/acting to 
alleviate 
suffering  
1. “Being 
moved by 
another’s 
suffering and 
wanting to 
help” 
(Lazarus, 
1991, p.289).  
(implied)    
2. An 
openness to 
the suffering 
of others with 
a commitment 
to relieve it 
(Dalai Lama, 
1995). 
Buddhist 
conceptualiza
tions also 
highlight 
cognitive 
components 
(e.g. the 
ability to 
imagine and 
reason about 
a person’s 
experiences) 
and 
approaching 
those who are 
suffering with 
tolerance and 
non-
judgement. 
(implied)    
 3. “Being 
touched by 
the suffering 
(explicitl
y stated)  
   
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of others, 
opening one’s 
awareness to 
others’ pain 
and not 
avoiding or 
disconnecting 
from it, so 
that feelings 
of kindness 
towards 
others and the  
4. 
Compassion 
consists of 
three facets: 
Noticing, 
feeling, and 
responding 
(Kanov et al., 
2004).  
(explicitl
y stated)  
   
5. “A deep 
awareness of 
the suffering 
of another 
coupled with 
the wish to 
relieve it” 
(Gilbert, 
2009, p. 13). 
Compassion 
consists of six 
‘attributes’: 
Sensitivity, 
Sympathy, 
Empathy, 
Motivation/C
aring, 
Distress 
Tolerance, 
and Non-
Judgement.  
 (explicitly 
stated)  
 
  
6. “The 
feeling that 
arises in 
witnessing 
another’s 
suffering and 
that motivates 
a subsequent 
desire to 
help” (Goetz 
(explicitl
y stated)    
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et al., 2010, 
p.351).  
7. “An 
orientation of 
mind that 
recognises 
pain and the 
universality 
of pain in 
human 
experience 
and the 
capacity to 
meet that pain 
with 
kindness, 
empathy, 
equanimity 
and patience” 
(Feldman & 
Kuyken, 
2011, p. 145).  
(explicitl
y stated)    
8. 
Compassion 
involves three 
elements: 
Kindness, 
mindfulness, 
and common 
humanity 
(Pommier, 
2011). 
(implied)    
a Soŵe defiŶitioŶs of coŵpassioŶ eǆplicitlǇ iŶclude aŶ eleŵeŶt of ͚recogŶiziŶg sufferiŶg͛, 
whereas in others, this is implied. We have iŶdicated whether ͚recogŶiziŶg sufferiŶg͛ is eǆplicitlǇ 
stated or implied in the following way: (explicitly stated) and (implied). 
Table 2. Quality ratings of measures of compassion 
Measure Content 
validity  
Factor 
structure 
Internal 
consist-
ency  
Test 
retest 
reliability  
Convergent / 
discriminant 
validity 
Floor/ 
ceiling 
effects  
Interpret-
ability 
Total 
/14 
SCS 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 7 
RCS 1 2 2 0 1 0 1 7 
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CLS 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 6 
SCBCS 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 6 
CS-P 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 6 
CS-M 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 4 
CCAT 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 4 
SCS-
SF 
1 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 
SCCCS 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Note. Rating: 0 = criterion not met/insufficient data to rate criterion; 1 = criterion partially 
met; 2 = criterion fully met. 
CCAT = Compassionate Care Assessment Tool; CLS = Compassionate Love Scale; CS-P = 
Pommier Compassion Scale; CS-M = Martins et al. Compassion Scale; RCS = Relational 
Compassion Scale; SCBCS = Santa Clara Brief Compassion Scale; SCCCS = Schwartz 
Center Compassionate Care Scale; SCS = Self-Compassion Scale; SCS-SF = Self-
Compassion Scale – Short Form. 
 
Table 3. Psychometric properties of measures of compassion (content validity, factor 
structure, internal consistency, and test-retest reliability). 
Measure Content 
validity: 
Factors 
captureda
/5 
Content 
validity: 
Item 
generatio
n 
(recipient 
and 
Proposed 
factor 
structure 
Support 
for factor 
structure: 
Type of 
analysis 
conducte
d (factor 
Internal 
consisten
cy: 
Adequate 
sample 
size for 
factor 
Internal 
consisten
cy: 
Cronbach 
alpha (for 
total scale 
and 
Test 
retest 
reliabilit
y: r 
(time 
between 
testing) 
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expert 
groups 
consulted
?) 
structure 
found)b 
analyses? subscales)  
CLS 4 (U, 
ER, T, & 
A)  
Recipient
s = yes 
Experts 
= yes 
Not 
reported 
EFA 
(single 
factor for 
both 
versions) 
Yes 
(N = 354) 
α = .95 
for both 
close 
others 
and 
strangers-
humanity 
versions  
Not 
reported 
SCBCS 2 (ER & 
A)  
Recipient
s = yes 
Experts 
= yes 
Not 
reported 
EFA 
(single 
factor) 
Yes 
(N = 223) 
α = .90 Not 
reported 
CS-M 1 (A) Recipient
s = yes 
Experts 
= yes 
Five 
factors 
EFA 
(two-
factor 
structure 
found but 
rejected 
in favour 
Yes 
(N = 310) 
α = .82  Not 
reported 
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of a 
single-
factor 
model) 
SCS 4 (U, 
ER, T, & 
A) 
Recipient
s = no 
Experts 
= yes 
Six 
factors 
represent
ed under 
a single 
overarchi
ng 
construct 
CFA (six 
factors) 
 
Yes 
(N = 391) 
Total α = 
.92,  
Subscales 
= .75 to 
.81. 
Total 
scale:  
r = .93,  
Subscal
es:  
r = .80 
to .88 
 (3 
weeks) 
SCS-SF 4 (U, 
ER, T, & 
A) 
Recipient
s = no 
Experts 
= yes 
Six 
factors 
represent
ed under 
a single 
overarchi
ng 
construct 
CFA (six 
factors 
represent
ed under 
a single 
overarchi
ng 
construct
) 
 
Yes 
(N = 415) 
Total α = 
.86, 
Subscales 
= .54 to 
.75. 
Not 
reported 
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CS-P 4 (R, U, 
ER, & 
A)  
Recipient
s = no 
Experts 
= yes 
Six 
factors 
represent
ed under 
a single 
overarchi
ng 
construct 
CFA (six 
factors 
represent
ed under 
a single 
overarchi
ng 
construct
) 
Yes 
(sample 
1: N = 
439, 
sample 2: 
N = 510) 
Total α = 
.90 
(sample 
1) and .87 
(sample 
2).  
Subscale 
αs < .70 
for 4/6 
subscales 
in sample 
1 and 1/6 
subscales 
in sample 
2.  
Not 
reported 
RCS 
(compassi
on for 
others and 
self-
compassio
n 
subscales) 
4 (R, 
ER, T, & 
A) 
Recipient
s = no 
Experts 
= yes 
Four 
factors 
CFA 
(four 
factors) 
Yes 
(N = 231) 
Subscales 
= .74 to 
.84  
Not 
reported 
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CCAT 3 (ER, T, 
& A) 
Recipient
s = yes 
Experts 
= yes 
Not 
reported 
EFA 
(four 
factors) 
Yes 
(N =  250) 
Total α > 
.70 (exact 
value not 
given), 
Subscales 
= .77 to 
.87. 
Not 
reported 
SCCCS 3 (R, 
ER, A) 
Recipient
s = yes 
Experts 
= yes 
Not 
reported 
EFA 
(single 
factor but 
analysis 
was not 
conducte
d on all 
items) 
CFA 
(single 
factor but 
analysis 
was not 
conducte
d on all 
items) 
Yes 
(N = 801) 
Subscales 
= .97 and 
.95. 
Single 
scale but 
total α 
missing. 
Not 
reported 
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CCAT = Compassionate Care Assessment Tool; CFA = confirmatory factor analysis; CLS = 
Compassionate Love Scale; CS-P = Pommier Compassion Scale; CS-M = Martins et al. 
Compassion Scale; EFA = exploratory factor analysis; RCS = Relational Compassion Scale; 
SCBCS = Santa Clara Brief Compassion Scale; SCCCS = Schwartz Center Compassionate 
Care Scale; SCS = Self-Compassion Scale; SCS-SF = Self-Compassion Scale – Short Form. 
aFive elements of compassion: R = recognising suffering; U = understanding the universality 
of suffering; ER = emotional resonance; T = tolerating uncomfortable feelings; A = acting or 
motivation to act to alleviate suffering. 
bFor details of the factors identified, refer to the results section. 
 
Table 4. Psychometric properties of measures of compassion (convergent validity and 
interpretability) 
Measure Convergent validity:  
Correlation (Pearson’s r) of compassion 
measure with measures of related constructs 
 
Interpretability: Subgroups tested 
for differences 
 
CLS PSP other-oriented empathy subscale and 
empathy items from Schieman & Van 
Gundy (2000): r = .50 to .68; 
PSP helpfulness subscale: r = .23 (close 
others), r = .32 (strangers); 
Frequency of church attendance: r = .22 
(close others), r = .43 (strangers); 
Volunteerism items from Mikulincer et al. 
(2005): r = .18 (close others), r = .35 
Gender (women scored 
significantly higher than men 
on both versions) 
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(strangers); 
Social support (developed by authors): r = 
.27 (strangers), r = .51 (close others); 
DSES: r = .39 (close others), r = .44 
(strangers). 
SCBCS IRI empathic concern subscale: r = .65; 
VIQ: r = .48; SCSORF: r = .27. 
Gender (women scored 
significantly higher than men) 
CS-M CLS: r = .66 Gender (women scored 
significantly higher than men), 
Education (significantly higher 
for those with University 
education versus High School 
or less), 
Income (significantly higher for 
those with annual income 
$40,000+ versus $10,000 or 
less), 
Age, race, and marital status 
(no differences) 
SCS DEQ self-criticism subscale: r = -.65; 
SOC: r = .41; TMMS attention subscale: r 
= .11; TMMS clarity subscale: r = .43; 
TMMS repair subscale: r = .55; RSES: r = 
Gender (women scored 
significantly lower than men) 
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.59. 
SCS-SF Not reported Not reported 
CS-P SCS: r = .01; SOC: r = .41; 3D-WS 
reflective subscale: r = .26; 3D-WS 
cognitive subscale: r = .39; 3D-WS 
affective subscale: r = .56; QMEE: r = 
.58; IRI empathic concern subscale: r = 
.65; 
IRI perspective taking subscale: r = .35; 
CLS close others version: r = .54; CLS 
strangers version: r = .27; S Q: r = -.12. 
Gender (women scored 
significantly higher than men) 
RCS 
(compassion 
for others 
and self-
compassion 
subscales) 
RCS compassion for others subscale & 
SCS: r = .24;  
RCS self-compassion subscale & SCS: r 
=  .65; 
RCS compassion for others subscale & 
EACS emotional expression & processing 
subscales: r = .41 and .42; 
RCS self-compassion subscale & EACS 
emotional expression & processing 
subscales: r = .51 and .46; 
RCS compassion for others subscale & 
SCSRS inadequate & hated self subscales:  
r = .03 and .12; 
Significant differences in RCS 
scores between Arts and 
Engineering students. The 
direction of the results for each 
subscale was not specified. 
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RCS self-compassion subscale & SCRS 
inadequate & hated self subscales:  
r =  -.29 and -.41; 
RCS compassion for others subscale & 
SCSRS reassured self subscale: r = .01; 
RCS self-compassion subscale & SCRS 
reassured self subscale: r =  .43; 
RCS compassion for others subscale and 
RSQ secure attachment: r = .34; 
RCS self-compassion subscale and RSQ 
secure attachment: r = .31; 
RCS compassion for others subscale and 
RSQ insecure attachment styles (fearful, 
preoccupied, dismissing, anxious, and 
avoidant):  
r = -.23, -.06, -.15, -.19, and -.22, 
respectively; 
RCS self-compassion subscale and RSQ 
insecure attachment styles (fearful, 
preoccupied, dismissing, anxious, and 
avoidant):  
r = -.22, -.15, -.05, -.03, and -.07, 
respectively. 
CCAT Not reported Gender (women scored carers 
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significantly higher than men), 
Marital status and reason for 
hospitalisation (no differences) 
SCCCS Overall satisfaction with recent 
hospitalisation (item set 1): r = .54; 
Overall satisfaction with recent 
hospitalisation (item set 2): r =  .60; 
Satisfaction with communication and 
emotional support (item set 1): r = .72; 
Satisfaction with communication and 
emotional support (item set 2): r = .64. 
Not reported 
3D-WS = 3-Dimensional Wisdom Scale (Ardelt, 2003); CCAT = Compassionate Care 
Assessment Tool; CLS = Compassionate Love Scale; CS-P = Pommier Compassion Scale; 
CS-M = Martins et al. Compassion Scale; DEQ = Depressive Experiences Questionnaire 
(Blatt, D’Afflitti, & Quinlan, 1976); DSES = Daily Spiritual Experience Scale (Underwood 
& Teresi, 2002); EACS = Emotional Approach Coping Scale (Stanton et al., 2000); IRI = 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980); PSP = Prosocial Personality Battery (Penner et 
al., 1995); QMEE = Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972); RCS = Relational Compassion Scale; RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965); RSQ = Relationship Scales Questionnaire (Griffin & Bartholomew, 
1994); SCBCS = Santa Clara Brief Compassion Scale; SCSORF = Santa Clara Strength of 
Religious Faith Questionnaire (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997); SCCCS = Schwartz Center 
Compassionate Care Scale; SCS = Self-Compassion Scale; SCS-SF = Self-Compassion Scale 
– Short Form; SCSRS = Self-Criticising/Attacking and Self-Reassuring Scale (Gilbert et al., 
2004); SMQ = Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (Chadwick et al., 2008); SOC = 
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Social Connectedness Scale (Lee & Robbins, 1995); TMMS = Trait Meta-Mood Scale 
(Salovey et al., 1995); VIQ = Vocational Identity Questionnaire (Dreher et al., 2007). 
a
 Five elements of compassion: R = recognising suffering; U = understanding the universality 
of suffering; ER = emotional resonance; T = tolerating uncomfortable feelings; A = acting or 
motivation to act to alleviate suffering. 
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Highlights 
 Compassion is recognized as important across many sectors of society 
 There is lack of consensus on definition and few self/observer-rated measures exist 
 Five elements of compassion are proposed after consolidating existing definitions  
 The psychometric properties of existing measures are poor, limiting their utility 
 A new measure of compassion with robust psychometric properties is needed 
